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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 97-1987 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
EARL PACKER HUNTE, 
a/k/a Earl Packer, 
a/k/a E 
 
Earl Packer Hunte, 
       Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 96-cr-00539-9) 
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 22, 1999 
 
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, COWEN, Circuit Judge, 
and STAGG,* District Judge 
 
(Filed: August 26, 1999) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Honorable Tom Stagg, U.S. District Judge for the Western District of 
Louisiana, sitting by designation. 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge 
 
Defendant Earl Packer Hunte was convicted by a jury in 
the United States District Court of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania of one count of conspiracy to distribute and 
to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. S 846. The government's evidence against Hunte, 
the sufficiency of which he does not challenge on appeal, 
established that he was a member of a violent, large-scale 
narcotics trafficking organization led by Darryl Coleman 
and Terrence Gibbs. See generally United States v. Gibbs, 
Slip. Op. at ___ (filed concurrently herewith). Specifically, 
the evidence demonstrated that Hunte agreed to distribute 
cocaine supplied by Gibbs, and that he agreed to carry out 
acts of violence to protect the illegal enterprise. 
 
Hunte's appeal raises a single issue. He contends that 
the government violated the so-called "anti-gratuity 
statute," 18 U.S.C. S 201(c)(2), by making promises of 
leniency to several cooperating witnesses in exchange for 
their truthful testimony against him.1  Relying exclusively on 
the Tenth Circuit's now vacated opinion in United States v. 
Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998) (Singleton I), 
rev'd en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) (Singleton II), cert. 
denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999), Hunte argues that the 
District Court erred in not suppressing the testimony of 
these cooperating witnesses. 
 
Because Hunte did not raise this issue in the District 
Court, we would ordinarily review it only for plain error. See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Due to the frequency with which this 
argument has been raised in the courts of this Circuit since 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Hunte has not provided us with the cooperating witnesses' plea 
agreements. Based on the parties' description of those agreements, we 
understand them to be of the usual sort. That is to say, the government 
agreed to consider filing a motion under S 5K1.1 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines in exchange for the witnesses' complete cooperation in the 
investigation and prosecution of Hunte and others, including providing 
testimony at trial. See Hunte Br. at 3; Gov. Br. at 2. 
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the issuance of Singleton I, however, we will take this 
opportunity to address the issue squarely. We hold that 
section 201(c)(2) does not prohibit the government from 
promising leniency to cooperating witnesses in exchange for 
truthful testimony. In so deciding, we align ourselves with 
the en banc decision of the Tenth Circuit, as well as every 
other circuit court that has considered the issue. See 
Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1298; accord United States v. 
Stephenson, ___ F.3d ___, 1999 WL 437082, at *7 (2d Cir. 
June 30, 1999); United States v. Lara, #6D 6D6D# F.3d ___, 1999 
WL 431140, at *9 (1st Cir. June 30, 1999); United States v. 
Condon, 170 F.3d 687, 688-89 (7th Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Johnson, 169 F.3d 1092, 1097 (8th Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1122-24 (11th Cir. 
1999); United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 987 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 418 (6th 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1348 (1999); United 
States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 366-68 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, 1999 WL 241837 (1999). Our 
reasons for rejecting the holding of Singleton I are set forth 
briefly below; given the numerous federal appellate 
decisions addressing this issue over the last year, an 
extended discussion would be redundant. 
 
The criminal statute in question, 18 U.S.C. S 201(c)(2), 
provides in pertinent part: 
 
       Whoever ... directly or indirectly, gives, offers or 
       promises anything of value to any person, for or 
       because of the testimony under oath or affirmation 
       given or to be given by such person as a witness upon 
       a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court 
       ... authorized by the laws of the United States to hear 
       evidence or take testimony ... shall be fined under this 
       title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or 
       both. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 201(c)(2). The Tenth Circuit panel in Singleton 
I concluded, inter alia, that the plain meaning of the term 
"whoever" includes the government, and that, accordingly, 
a government attorney's promise of leniency to a witness in 
exchange for that witness' testimony violates S 201(c)(2). 
144 F.3d at 1345-48. We disagree. 
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In Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), the 
Supreme Court described a canon of statutory construction 
that provides that a statute does not apply to the 
government or affect governmental rights unless the text of 
the statute expressly includes the government. Id. at 383; 
see also The Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. 
(19 Wall) 227, 229 (1873) ("It is a familiar principle that the 
King is not bound by any act of Parliament unless he be 
named therein by special and particular words.") The 
Nardone Court stated that the canon has been applied in 
two categories of cases. "The first is where an act, if not so 
limited, would deprive the sovereign of a recognized or 
established prerogative title or interest." Id. at 383. The 
second category is "where a reading which would include 
such [government] officers would work obvious absurdity." 
Id. at 384. We agree with the courts that have held that 
this type of case -- where the government has agreed to 
move for leniency in exchange for testimony -- falls within 
both categories described in Nardone. See Ramsey, 165 
F.3d at 988-90; Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1300-01; Ware, 
161 F.3d at 419. 
 
First, construing section 201(c)(2) to preclude the 
government from offering leniency in exchange for truthful 
testimony would deprive the sovereign of an established 
and recognized prerogative. "The prosecutorial prerogative 
to recommend leniency in exchange for truthful testimony 
arises from English common law, see Ware, 161 F.3d at 
419, and has been repeatedly approved by the United 
States Supreme Court . . .." Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 988 
(citing The Whisky Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878)); see also 
United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th 
Cir. 1987) ("No practice is more ingrained in our criminal 
justice system than the practice of the government calling 
a witness who is an accessory to the crime for which the 
defendant is charged and having that witness testify under 
a plea bargain that promises him a reduced sentence."). We 
are not persuaded by the Singleton I panel's claim that 
section 201(c)(2) is removed from this category because the 
statute only limits the practices of the government's agents, 
not the sovereign itself. 144 F.3d at 1345-46.2 If section 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In so concluding, the Singleton I court relied on the Supreme Court's 
statement in Nardone that "[t]he rule of exclusion of the sovereign is 
less 
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201(c)(2) did indeed prohibit promises of leniency in 
exchange for testimony, it is surely the government's 
interests that would be affected, not those of its 
representatives. See Ware, 161 F.3d at 421 ("When an 
assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) enters into a plea 
agreement with a defendant, that plea agreement is 
between the United States government and the 
defendant."). 
 
Second, the application of section 201(c)(2) to the 
government in cases such as this would work an obvious 
absurdity. As many courts have observed, interpreting 
section 201(c)(2) to forbid promises of leniency in exchange 
for truthful testimony would "preclude enforcement or limit 
the efficacy of the terms of several more recent -- and more 
specific -- statutes [or Rules or Guidelines enacted 
purusant to statute], all of which presuppose the potential 
use of testimony in exchange for non-prosecution 
agreements, leniency recommendations, and/or other 
valuable promises." United States v. Lara, 1999 WL 
431140, at *9 (1st Cir. June 30, 1999); see also Ramsey, 
165 F.3d at 990; Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1305-06. 
Numerous statutes adopted after the anti-gratuity law, for 
example, authorize sentence reductions for defendants who 
have provided "substantial assistance" in the investigation 
or prosecution of others. 28 U.S.C. S 994(n) (instructing the 
United States Sentencing Commission to ensure that 
Guidelines "take into account a defendant's substantial 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another 
person who has committed an offense"); 18 U.S.C.S 3553(e) 
(authorizing court to impose a sentence below a statutory 
minimum upon motion of the government "to reflect a 
defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or 
prosecution of another person"); U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 (allowing 
government motion for a sentence reduction below the 
applicable sentencing range when a defendant provides 
substantial assistance); Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (allowing 
government motion for a sentence reduction based on post- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
stringently applied where the operation of law is upon the agents or 
servants of the government rather than on the sovereign itself." Nardone, 
302 U.S. at 383 (footnote omitted). 
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sentencing substantial assistance). It is plain to us that the 
"substantial assistance" referred to in these statutes 
includes providing testimony against others. See  U.S.S.G. 
S 5K1.1(a)(2) (in deciding the extent of a"substantial 
assistance" sentencing departure, court may consider "the 
truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any 
information or testimony provided by the defendant") 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, adopting the holding of 
Singleton I would create an "absurd conflict," Ramsey, 165 
F.3d at 990, between section 201(c)(2) and the above-cited 
statutes.3 
 
Finally, we reject the holding of Singleton I  because it is 
completely implausible to us that Congress, in enacting 
section 201(c)(2), intended to sub silentio overrule the 
government's long-standing practice of entering into 
leniency-for-testimony agreements. Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 
991. As the en banc Tenth Circuit explained, "we must 
presume if Congress had intended that section 201(c)(2) 
overturn this aspect of American legal culture, it would 
have done so in clear, unmistakable, and unarguable 
language." Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1301; cf. Green v. Bock 
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989) ("A party 
contending that legislative action changed settled law has 
the burden of showing that the legislature intended such a 
change."). There is nothing in the statute that even 
approaches the type of clear statement that we would 
expect if Congress had intended the result reached by the 
Singleton I panel. Nor is there any statement in the relevant 
legislative history which would support such a conclusion. 
Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 991. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court did not 
commit any error -- plain or otherwise -- in admitting the 
testimony of the cooperating witnesses against Hunte.4 
Accordingly, Hunte's conviction will be affirmed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Other courts have also observed that the Singleton I panel's holding 
would create a conflict with the Witness Relocation and Protection Act, 
18 U.S.C. S 3521 and the federal immunity statutes, 18 U.S.C. SS 6001- 
05. See, e.g., Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 990. 
 
4. We note that this case presents only the question of whether section 
201(c)(2) prohibits the government from making promises of leniency in 
exchange for testimony. It does not present the situation, for example, in 
which a witness has received money from the government, arguably in 
exchange for testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Medina, 41 F. Supp. 
2d 38 (D. Mass. 1999). We have no occasion here to consider the 
applicability, if any, of section 201(c)(2) in such a case. 
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